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Professor Martyn summarized her paper, Visions of the EternalLaw Firm:
The Future of Law Firm Screens. She agreed with Professor Palay that law
firms have continued to increase in size, but focused on law firm growth as a
cause of increasing conflict-of-interest problems.
After briefly summarizing the current legal regulation of conflicts created
by both current clients and former clients, Professor Martyn examined future
large law firms with screens in place to prevent conflicts. Analogizing to the
development of screens in other settings such as commercial banking,
securities firms, and bankruptcy proceedings, she suggested that an elaborate
system of external regulation of screens in law firms might evolve.
Professor Martyn argued that one alternative to such extensive regulation
may be avoiding the conflicts that create the need for screens by downsizing
law firms. She suggested that smaller firms might also bring societal and
professional benefits.
Several participants took issue with some points made in Professor
Martyn's paper. One partner from a large firm agreed with the thesis of the
paper that conflict-of-interest rules will affect law firm growth. He noted that
few jurisdictions now allow screening to avoid conflicts of interest caused by
lateral hires. He suggested that screening, if allowed, provides a useful
protection, but need not be as rigid as Professor Martyn suggested. Another
large-firm partner objected to the idea that a firm hiring a lawyer should
require the lawyer to bring a list of clients represented by the lawyer's former
firm. A practitioner from a smaller firm also took issue with this suggestion,
raising issues of practicality and confidentiality.
Two firm partners argued that current-client conflicts of interest are a
more significant problem to law firms than former-client conflicts. One
partner raised the issue of conflicts of interest arising from representation of
competitors. One professor referred to Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper,
Hamilton & Scheetzl, in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that
the conflict-of-interest rules could apply in the context of a law firm's
representation of a competitor of a client. A judge at the conference pointed
out that expansion of the conflict-of-interest rules to include competitors would
threaten the viability of boutique law firms that specialized in particular areas
of practice.
Professor Martyn agreed that current-client conflicts are a significant
problem. The focus of her paper was on a different issue: whether effective
screening mechanisms would retard law firm growth. Professor Martyn noted
in response to the suggestion that screening mechanisms for lawyers need not
be as rigid as in other fields that in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. KerrMcGee Corp.,2 the Washington office of Kirkland & Ellis had shared its case

1. 602 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 1992).
2. 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978).
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file with its Chicago office despite an attempt to screen the two offices from
each other. She also pointed out that her suggestion that law firms ask new
lawyers for a list of former clients was intended to protect law firms so that
they could be aware of possible conflicts, not to serve as a basis for disqualification if the firm failed to ask for a list. She also expressed the opinion that
the law dealing with screening seemed to be developing reasonably. She
referred to cases and opinions allowing screening for paralegals and contract
lawyers.
The group discussed various solutions to conflict-of-interest problems that
firms encounter. One professor suggested that prospective waivers of conflicts
of interest are a tool that law firms could use to deal with some unrelatedmatter conflict-of-interest problems. He referred to ABA Formal Ethics
Opinion 93-372 (Apr. 16, 1993), which, with some limitations, approved of
the use of prospective waivers of conflicts of interest. One judge questioned,
however, whether judges would enforce prospective waivers, asking: "Can
you really waive all potential conflicts that you can't anticipate at the time of
the signing of the purported waiver agreement that might occur somewhere
down the pike?" The professor responded that courts should apply an
"informed consent" requirement, but suggested that sophisticated business
clients could give advance consent to at least some conflicts, such as those
involving competitors. Another professor remarked that he had "never seen
an invalidated waiver where the client is a sophisticated client with in-house
counsel," and predicted that the use of specific waivers addressed to in-house
counsel would grow.
An attorney who served as corporate counsel gave a client's perspective
on the issue of consent to conflicts of interest. She noted that when law firms
sought her consent to a conflict of interest, she often found it difficult to
evaluate the issue because of inadequate information. She also noted the
practical problem of identifying all of the affiliates of large corporations,
stating: "I assure you that getting the list of affiliates of a large corporation on
any given day is a major undertaking." A law firm partner agreed with the
point about the difficulty of getting consent, opining:
[]t is very difficult not only to communicate to the client from whom
one's seeking consent what the nature of the matter is, it's also difficult
once you even get the list of affiliates to determine internally in the firm
enough about the facts and potential issues to know whether or not you fall
on one side of the rule or another.
A professor suggested that the imputed-disqualification rule needed to be
reconsidered, especially in the context of the large firm. A lawyer from a
small firm agreed that the rule needed reexamination, but he noted that the
problem existed for small firms as well. He pointed out that in California the
imputed-disqualification rule had been used to disqualify a lawyer who had
hired a paralegal. He also raised the issue of the application of the imputeddisqualification rule to contract lawyers and summer associates. He offered
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss5/12
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the prospect that every lawyer would have to carry a passport to determine
possible conflicts of interest. Another participant pointed out that in large law
firms, many partners do not even know each other, but he still agreed with the
general rule of imputed disqualification because of the difficulty of drawing a
line. He feared that a more flexible test would promote peripheral litigation.
Another participant felt that some applications of the conflict-of-interest
rules to unrelated matters are "silly." He called for a fundamental reexamination of the conflict-of-interest rules. He also noted that a law firm's desire to
maintain good client relations would often dictate that the firm seek client
consent before undertaking representation against a client in an unrelated
matter. One of the academic members of the group agreed with the proposal
for a fundamental reconsideration of the conflict-of-interest rules. He
suggested that the rules could distinguish between clients that a firm represented generally and those that it represented on occasional matters. One judge
offered some reservations about calls for a fundamental reexamination of the
rules:
I think one thing we ought to remember about this area is that these ideas
of loyalty and confidence didn't just spring full-grown from the head of the
ABA 75 or 100 years ago. They've been around forever, since people
have been advocating other people's problems. I must hear an argument
a week that, you know, this Constitution really needs to be scrapped.
And, you know, even the Ten Commandments may need some very close
examination, but it doesn't comport with the modem way we work. All
these things were developed before computers, et cetera.
The judge questioned whether all of the discussion of screening really was
missing the mark because it focused on protecting lawyers rather than on the
real interests of clients.
A partner in a large firm agreed with the view that a reexamination of the
rules is necessary, "[n]ot because the rules aren't profoundly based ....

[b]ut

[because] the way in which they are applied and the situations in which they're
applied has dramatically changed. . .

."

He pointed to changes both in client

behavior and in the structure of law firms. He also noted that large clients
now produce many different products, operate nationally and internationally,
and are organized in numerous subsidiaries, often with separate general
counsels for each subsidiary. Clients frequently no longer select law firms to
represent them generally, but instead hire firms to represent them in particular
areas of the country or on particular matters. Changes in the manner in which
clients hire law firms are also taking place. Many clients now use "beauty
contests" as their selection process.
Another partner agreed with this point, noting a decline in the "emotional
connection" between clients and law firms. He suggested, however, that a
correction may be going on as more in-house lawyers see the benefits of a
long-term relationship with a firm.
A partner in a large firm also pointed to changes in the structure of law
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firms. Large law firms are now highly departmentalized, operating in many
different cities, with the result that many partners do not even know partners
in other locations, much less deal with them in a way that could result in the
disclosure of confidential information. He concluded by expressing the view
that not only do lawyers have duties to clients, but clients should have duties
to lawyers. He felt that in some instances clients were using lawyers in ways
that he found unacceptable. He noted, however, that he had sensed an
increasing flexibility by general counsel in dealing with conflict-of-interest
questions.
Taking up the theme of the need for a fundamental reexamination of the
rules, a partner in a large law firm referred to some of the consequences of the
current rule structure. He pointed out that the unrelated-matter conflict rules
force firms to be careful about accepting new business because of the possible
conflicts a new client might create in the future. In his firm, a partner must
consult with selected other partners before undertaking a new matter. He also
noted that increased law firm malpractice exposure is having an impact on firm
decisions whether to take on new. clients.
One professor also agreed with the calls for reconsideration of the rules.
He expressed mixed emotions about the issue of loyalty. In some instances
lawyers may not be sufficiently loyal to clients, but in others-the savings and
loan debacle, for example-lawyers may be too loyal. He suggested that the
rules should try to identify an "optimum level of loyalty." He also pointed out
that the rules might distinguish between individuals and entities.
One judge questioned whether it is. desirable to leave the issue of
development of conflict-of-interest rules to judges, fearing that judges would
tend to produce rigid rules. A professor suggested the possibility of a new
procedural device for dealing with conflicts of interest: an arbitration panel
that could operate swiftly and would have the flexibility to define the
conditions under which representation could continue.
A lawyer in a small firm noted that concerns about conflicts of interest
and screening have occurred during a period involving significant movement
by lawyers between firms. She suggested that this era might be changing and
that firms would be paying more attention to keeping and nurturing lawyers.
She referred to the "economic insanity of the pyramid, in which you spend an
enormous amount of money taking young lawyers or new lawyers who know
how to do nothing, pour into them all of your resources on the assumption that
they are never going to be partners in your firm." She also raised the question
of whether the increased commercialization of the profession is creating a
loyalty issue of a different sort: Lawyers now find it more difficult, for fear
of losing business, to give independent advice that clients might not want to
hear. She also raised the question of the need for discussion of the scope of
a client's "right to representation" in the civil, as opposed to the criminal,
context.
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